| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| From | Office of Terje Rod-Larsen <executiveoffice@ipinst.org> |
| Sent | Monday, March 5, 2012 7:19 PM |
| Subject | March 3 update |
| Document date (body) | 3 March, 2012 |

| # | Source | Title | Author | Link fragment |
|---:|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | The Atlantic | Obama to Iran and Israel: 'As Pres=dent of the United States, I Don't Bluff' | Jeffrey Goldberg | .../blank_quirks.html#a |
| 3 | The Daily Beast | Shimon Peres’s Influence Wanes a= Israel Grows More Bellicose Toward Iran | Dan Ephron | .../blank_quirks.html#c |
| 5 | The Daily Star | Hamas rattles the Resistance Axis<=span> | Rami G. Khouri | .../blank_quirks.html#e |
| 6 | Pew Research Center | Millennials will benefit and suffe= due to their hyperconnected lives | (no author listed) | .../blank_quirks.html#f |

(Overview)

Ar=icle 1.

The Atlantic=/p>

Obama to Iran=and Israel: 'As President of the United States, I Don't Bluff'<=b>

Jeffrey Goldberg </=pan>

Mar 2 2012 -- At the White House on Monday, President Obama wil= seek to persuade the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, to postp=ne whatever plans he may have to bomb Iran's nuclear facilities in the coming months. Obama will argue that unde= his leadership, the United States "has Israel's back," and that=he will order the U.S. military to destroy Iran's nuclear program if econo=ic sanctions fail to compel Tehran to shelve its nuclear ambitions. In the most extensive interview he has given about the looming Iran crisis,=Obama told me earlier this week that both Iran and Israel should take seri=usly the possibility of American action against Iran's nuclear facilities.="I think that the Israeli government recognizes that, as president of the United States, I don't bluff." H= went on, "I also don't, as a matter of sound policy, go around adver=ising exactly what our intentions are. But I think both the Iranian and th= Israeli governments recognize that when the United States says it is unacceptable for Iran to have a nuclear weapo=, we mean what we say." The 45-minute Oval Office convers=tion took place less than a week before the president was scheduled to add=ess the annual convention of AIPAC, the pro-Israel lobbying group, and then meet, the next day, with Prime Minister Netanyahu=at the White House. In the interview, Obama stated specifically that "=all options are on the table," and that the final option is the "=military component." But the president also said that sanctions organized by his administration have put Iran in a "wo=ld of hurt," and that economic duress might soon force the regime in =ehran to rethink its efforts to pursue a nuclear-weapons program. &q=ot;Without in any way being under an illusion about Iranian intentions, without in any way being naive about the nature of tha= regime, they are self-interested," Obama said. "It is possible =or them to make a strategic calculation that, at minimum, pushes much furt=er to the right whatever potential breakout capacity they may have, and that may turn out to to be the best decision f=r Israel's national-security=threat security." The president to the United also States said that even Tehran=s if Israel nuclear were not program a target would of Iran's represent violent a rhetoric, "profound" and he dismissed the argument that the United =tates could successfully contain a nuclear Iran. "You're talkin= about the most volatile region in the world," he said. "It will=not be tolerable to a number of states in that region for Iran to have a nuclear weapon and them not to have a nuclear weapon. l=an is known to sponsor terrorist organizations, so the threat of prolifera=ion becomes that much more severe." He went on to say, "The dang=rs of an Iran getting nuclear weapons that then leads to a free-for-all in the Middle East is something that I think =ould be very dangerous for the world." The president was =ost animated when talking about the chaotic arms race he fears would break=out if Iran acquired a nuclear weapon, and he seemed most frustrated when talking about what he sees as a deliberate cam=aign by Republicans to convince American Jews that he is anti-Israel. &quo=;Every single commitment I have made to the state of Israel and its securi=y, I have kept," he told me. "Why is it that despite me never failing to support Israel on every single problem=that they've had over the last three years, that there are still questions=about that?" Though he struck a consistently pro-Israel p=sture during the interview, Obama went to great lengths to caution Israel that a premature strike might inadvertently help=Iran: "At a time when there is not a lot of sympathy for Iran and its=only real ally, (Syria,) is on the ropes, do we

want a distraction in whic= suddenly Iran can portray itself as a victim?" He also said he would try to convince Netanyah= that the only way to bring about a permanent end to a country's nuclear p=ogram is to convince the country in question that nuclear weapons are not =n its best interest. "Our argument is going to be that it is important for us to see if we can solve this thing permanent=y, as opposed to temporarily," he said, "and the only way histor=cally that a country has ultimately decided not to get nuclear weapons wit=out constant military intervention has been when they themselves take [nuclear weapons] off the table. That's what hap=ened in Libya, that's what happened in South Africa." Holocaust-scale And=though threat to broadly the Jewish sympathetic state, and to Netanyahu's the Jewish people, often-stated Obama fear suggested that Iran's strongly nu=lear that program =istorical represents fears cannot a be the sole basis for precipitous action: "The=prime minister is head of a modern state that is mindful of the profound c=sts of any military action, and in our consultations with the Israeli government, I think they take those costs, =nd potential unintended consequences, very seriously." Bu= when I asked the president if he thought Israel could damage its reputati=n among Americans with an attack on Iran -- an attack that could provoke Iranian retaliation against American targets, an= could cause massive economic disruption -- he said, "I think we in t=e United States instinctively sympathize with Israel." President Obam= also shared fascinating insights about his sometimes tension-filled relationship with Netanyahu -- and spoke at lengt= about Syria -- but for that, you'll have to read the entire interview. He=e is a transcript of our conversation:

JEFFREY GOLDBERG: From what we understand, Prime Minister Netanyahu =s going to ask you for some specific enunciations of red lines, for specif=c promises related to the Iranian nuclear program. What is your message to=the prime minister going to be? What do you want to get across to him?

PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA: First of all, it's important to say that I d=n't know exactly what the prime minister is going to be coming with. We ha=en't gotten any indication that there is some sharp "ask" that i= going to be presented. Both the United States and Israel have been in constant consultation about a very difficult issue= and that is the prospect of Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon. This is some=hing that has been one of my top five foreign-policy concerns since I came=into office. We, immediately upon taking over, mapped out a strategy that said we are going to mobilize the =nternational community around this issue and isolate Iran to send a clear =essage to them that there is a path they can follow that allows them to re=oin the community of nations, but if they refused to follow that path, that there would be an escalating ser=es of consequences. Three years later, we can look back and say we h=ve been successful beyond most people's expectations. When we came in, Ira= was united and on the move, and the world was divided about how to address this issue. Today, the world is as =nited as we've ever seen it around the need for Iran to take a different p=th on its nuclear program, and Iran is isolated and feeling the severe eff=cts of the multiple sanctions that have been placed on it. At the same time, we understand that the bot=om line is: Does the problem get solved? And I think that Israel, understa=dably, has a profound interest not just in good intentions but in actual r=sults. And in the conversations I've had over the course of three years, and over the course of the last three =onths and three weeks, what I've emphasized is that preventing Iran from g=tting a nuclear weapon isn't just in the interest of Israel, it is profoun=ly in the security interests of the United States, and that when I say we're not taking any option off the=table, we mean it. We are going to continue to apply pressure until Iran t=kes a different course.

GOLDBERG: Go back to this language, 'All options on the table.' You'=e probably said it SO or 100 times. And a lot of people believe it, but th= two main intended audiences, the supreme leader of Iran and the prime min=ster of Israel, you could argue, don't entirely trust this. The impression we get is that the Israeli gover=ment thinks this is a vague expression that's been used for so many years.=Is there some ramping-up of the rhetoric you're going to give them?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: I think the Israeli people understand it, I think t=e American people understand it, and I think the Iranians understand it. 1= means a political component that involves isolating Iran; it means an eco=omic component that involves unprecedented and crippling sanctions; it means a diplomatic component in which we have =een able to strengthen the coalition that presents Iran with various optio=s through the P-5 plus 1 and ensures that the IAEA (International Atomic E=ergy Agency] is robust in evaluating Iran's military program; and it includes a military component. And I think=people understand that. I think that the Israeli government recogniz=s that, as president of the United States, I don't bluff. I also don't, as=a matter of sound policy, go around advertising exactly what our intentions are. But I think both the Iranian =nd the Israeli governments recognize that when the United States says it i=

unacceptable for Iran to have a nuclear weapon, we mean what we say. Let =escribe very specifically why this is important to us.

In addition to the profound threat that it poses to Israel, one of our stro=gest allies in the world; in addition to the outrageous language that has =een directed toward Israel by the leaders of the Iranian government -- if =ran gets a nuclear weapon, this would run completely contrary to my policies of nonproliferation. The risk= of an Iranian nuclear weapon falling into the hands of terrorist organiza=ions are profound. It is almost certain that other players in the region w=uld feel it necessary to get their own nuclear weapons. So now you have the prospect of a nuclear arms race i= the most volatile region in the world, one that is rife with unstable gov=rnments and sectarian tensions. And it would also provide Iran the additio=al capability to sponsor and protect its proxies in carrying out terrorist attacks, because they are less fearf=l of retaliation.

GOLDBERG: What would your position be if Israel weren't in this pict=re?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: It would still be a profound national-security inte=est of the United States to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon.

GOLDBERG: Why, then, is this issue so often seen as binary, always d=fined as Israel versus Iran?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: I think it has to do with a legitimate concern on t=e part of Israel that they are a small country in a tough neighborhood, an= as a consequence, even though the U.S. and Israel very much share assessm=nts of how quickly Iran could obtain breakout capacity, and even though there is constant consultation and inte=ligence coordination around that question, Israel feels more vulnerable. A=d I think the prime minister and the defense minister, [Ehud Barak,J feel = profound, historic obligation not to put Israel in a position where it cannot act decisively and unilate=ally to protect the state of Israel. I understand those concerns, and as a=consequence, I think it's not surprising that the way it gets framed, at I=ast in this country, where the vast majority of people are profoundly sympathetic to Israel's plight and =otential vulnerabilities -- that articles and stories get framed in terms =f Israel's potential vulnerability. But I want to make clear t=at when we travel around the world and make presentations about this issue, that's not how we frame it. We frame it as= this is something in the national-security interests of the United States=and in the interests of the world community. And I assure you that Europe =ould not have gone forward with sanctions on Iranian oil imports -- which are very difficult for them to c=rry out, because they get a lot of oil from Iran -- had it not been for th=ir understanding that it is in the world's interest, to prevent Iran from =etting a nuclear weapon. China would not have abided by the existing sanctions coming out of the National=Security Council, and other countries around the world would not have unif=ed around those sanctions, had it not been for us making the presentation =bout why this was important for everyone, not just one country.

GOLDBERG: Is it possible that the prime minister of Israel has over-=earned the lessons of the Holocaust?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: I think the prime minister has a profound responsib=lity to protect the Israeli people in a hostile neighborhood, and I am cer=ain that the history of the Holocaust and of anti-Semitism and brutality d=rected against the Jewish people for more than a millennium weighs on him when he thinks about these questi=ns. I think it's important to recognize, though, that the prime mini=ter is also head of a modern state that is mindful of the profound costs o= any military action, and in our consultations with the Israeli government, I think they take those costs, and potential =nintended consequences, very seriously.

GOLDBERG: Do you think Israel could cause damage to itself in Americ= by preempting the Iranian nuclear program militarily?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: I don't know how it plays in America. I think we in=the United States instinctively sympathize with Israel, and I think politi=al support for Israel is bipartisan and powerful. In my discussions with I=rael, the key question that I ask is: How does this impact their own security environment? I've said it publ=cly and I say it privately: ultimately, the Israeli prime minister and the=defense minister and others in the government have to make their decisions=about what they think is best for Israel's security, and I don't presume to tell them what is best for them.=But as Israel's closest

friend and ally, and as one that has devoted the l=st three years to making sure that Israel has additional security capabili=ies, and has worked to manage a series of difficult problems and questions over the past three years, I do=point out to them that we have a sanctions architecture that is far more e=fective than anybody anticipated; that we have a world that is about as un=ted as you get behind the sanctions; that our assessment, which is shared by the Israelis, is that Iran does no= yet have a nuclear weapon and is not yet in a position to obtain a nuclea= weapon without us having a pretty long lead time in which we will know th=t they are making that attempt. In that context, our argument is going to be that it is important for us t= see if we can solve this thing permanently, as opposed to temporarily. An= the only way, historically, that a country has ultimately decided not to =et nuclear weapons without constant military intervention has been when they themselves take [nuclear weapons]=off the table. That's what happened in Libya, that's what happened in Sout= Africa. And we think that, without in any way being under an illusion abo=t Iranian intentions, without in any way being naive about the nature of that regime, they are self-interes=ed. They recognize that they are in a bad, bad place right now. It is poss=ble for them to make a strategic calculation that, at minimum, pushes much=further to the right whatever potential breakout capacity they may have, and that may turn out to be the best deci=ion for Israel's security. These are difficult questions, and again, if I =ere the prime minister of Israel, I'd be wrestling with them. As president=of the United States, I wrestle with them as well.

GOLDBERG: Could you shed some light on your relationship with the pr=me minister? You've met with him more than with any other world leader. It=s assumed that you have a dysfunctional relationship. What is it like?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: I actually think the relationship is very functiona=, and the proof of the pudding is in the eating. The fact of the matter is= we've gotten a lot of business done with Israel over the last three years= I think the prime minister -- and certainly the defense minister -- would acknowledge that we've never h=d closer military and intelligence cooperation. When you look at what I've=done with respect to security for Israel, from joint training and joint ex=rcises that outstrip anything that's been done in the past, to helping finance and construct the Iron Dome prog=am to make sure that Israeli families are less vulnerable to missile strik=s, to ensuring that Israel maintains its qualitative military edge, to fig=ting back against delegitimization of Israel, whether at the [UN] Human Rights Council, or in front of the UN=General Assembly, or during the Goldstone Report, or after the flare-up in=olving the flotilla -- the truth of the matter is that the relationship ha= functioned very well.

GOLDBERG: Are you friends? Do you talk about things other than busin=ss?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: You know, the truth of the matter is, both of us ha=e so much on our plates that there's not always a lot of time to have disc=ssions beyond business. Having said that, what I think is absolutely true =s that the prime minister and I come out of different political traditions. This is one of the few times i= the history of U.S.-Israeli relations where you have a government from th= right in Israel at the same time you have a center-left government in the=United States, and so I think what happens then is that a lot of political interpretations of our relationshi= get projected onto this. But one thing that I have found in working with =rime Minister Netanyahu is that we can be very frank with each other, very=blunt with each other, very honest with each other. For the most part, when we have differences, they are tac=ical and not strategic. Our objectives are a secure United States, a secur= Israel, peace, the capacity for our kids to grow up in safety and securit= and not have to worry about bombs going off, and being able to promote business and economic growth and comm=rce. We have a common vision about where we want to go. At any given momen= -- as is true, frankly, with my relationship with every other foreign lea=er -- there's not going to be perfect alignment of how we achieve these objectives.

GOLDBERG: In an interview three years ago, right before he became pr=me minister, Netanyahu told me <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/03/netanyahu-to=obama-stop-iran-or-i-will/7390/> that he believes Iran is being run by a "messian=c apocalyptic cult." Last week, General Martin Dempsey, the chairman =f the Joint Chiefs of Staff. referred to the Iranian leadership as "r=tional." Where do you fall on this continuum? Do you feel self-interest? that the leaders of Iran might be so irrational that they will=not act in what we would understand to be their

PRESIDENT OBAMA: I think you're right to describe it as a continuum.=There is no doubt they are isolated. They have a very ingrown political sy=tem. They are founded and fueled on hostility towards the United States, l=rael, and to some degree the West. And they have shown themselves willing to go outside international norms arc' international rules to achieve their objectives. All of this makes them =angerous. They've also been willing to crush opposition in their own count=y in brutal and bloody ways.

GOLDBERG: Do you think they are messianic?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: I think it's entirely legitimate to say that this i= a regime that does not share our worldview or our values. I do think, and=this is what General Dempsey was probably referring to, that as we look at=how they operate and the decisions they've made over the past three decades, that they care about the regime'= survival. They're sensitive to the opinions of the people and they are tr=ubled by the isolation that they're experiencing. They know, for example, =hat when these kinds of sanctions are applied, it puts a world of hurt on them. They are able to make decisi=ns based on trying to avoid bad outcomes from their perspective. So if the='re presented with options that lead to either a lot of pain from their pe=spective, or potentially a better path, then there's no guarantee that they can't make a better decision.

American-led GOLDBERG: sanctions It effort. seems unlikely that a regime built on anti-Americanism =ould want to appear to succumb to an

PRESIDENT OBAMA: I think the question here is going to be: What exac=ly are their genuine interests? Now, what we've un-Islamic. seen, what And we've those heard are formal dir=ctly speeches from them from over the the supreme last couple leader of and weeks their is foreign that nuclear minister. weapons are s=nful and

GOLDBERG: Do you believe their sincerity?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: My point here is not that I believe the sincerity o= the statements coming out of the regime. The point is that for them to pr=ve to the international community that their intentions are peaceful and t=at they are, in fact, not pursuing weapons, is not inconsistent with what they've said. So it doesn't require=them to knuckle under to us. What it does require is for them to actually =how to the world that there is consistency between their actions and their=statements. And that's something they should be able to do without losing face.

GOLDBERG: Let me flip this entirely around and ask: Why is containme=t not your policy? In the sense that we contained the Soviet Union, North =orea --

PRESIDENT OBAMA: It's for the reason I described -- because you're t=lking about the most volatile region in the world. It will not be tolerabl= to a number of states in that region for Iran to have a nuclear weapon an= them not to have a nuclear weapon. Iran is known to sponsor terrorist organizations, so the threat of prolife=ation becomes that much more severe. The only analogous situation is North=Korea. We have applied a lot of pressure on North Korea as well and, in fa=t, today found them willing to suspend some of their nuclear activities and missile testing and come back=to the table. But North Korea is even more isolated, and certainly less ca=able of shaping the environment [around it] than Iran is. And so the dange=s of an Iran getting nuclear weapons that then leads to a free-for-all in the Middle East is something that I t=ink would be very dangerous for the world.

GOLDBERG: Do you see accidental nuclear escalation as an issue?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Absolutely. Look, the fact is, I don't think any of=it would be accidental. I think it would be very intentional. If Iran gets=a nuclear weapon, I won't name the countries, but there are probably four =r five countries in the Middle East who say, "We are going to start a program, and we will have nucl=ar weapons." And at that point, the prospect for miscalculation in a =egion that has that many tensions and fissures is profound. You essentiall= then duplicate the challenges of India and Pakistan fivefold or tenfold.

GOLDBERG: With everybody pointing at everybody else.

PRESIDENT OBAMA: With everybody pointing at everybody else.

GOLDBERG: What I'm getting at specifically is, let's assume there's = Hezbollah attack on Israel. Israel responds into Lebanon. Iran goes on so=e kind of a nuclear alert, and then one-two-three --

PRESIDENT OBAMA: The potential for escalation in those circumstances=is profoundly dangerous, and in addition to just the potential human costs=of a nuclear escalation like that in the Middle East, just imagine what wo=Id happen in terms of the world economy. The possibilities of the sort of energy disruptions that we've ne=er seen before occurring, and the world economy basically coming to a halt= would be pretty profound. So when I say this is in the U.S. interest, I'm=not saying this is something we'd like to solve. I'm saying this is something we have to solve.

GOLDBERG: One of the aspects of this is the question of whether it's=plausible that Barack Obama would ever use military power to stop Iran. Th= Republicans are trying to make this an issue -- and not only the Republic=ns -- saying that this man, by his disposition, by his character, by his party, by his center-left outloo=, is not going to do that.

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Look, if people want to say about me that I have a =rofound preference for peace over war, that every time I order young men a=d women into a combat theater and then see the consequences on some of the=, if they're lucky enough to come back, that this weighs on me -- I make no apologies for that. Because anyb=dy who is sitting in my chair who isn't mindful of the costs of war should='t be here, because it's serious business. These aren't video games that w='re playing here. Now, having said that, I think it's fair to say that the last three years, I've shown =yself pretty clearly willing, when I believe it is in the core national in=erest of the United States, to direct military al-Qaeda actions, was even on when its [kne=s] they ent=il well before enormous we took risks. out And bin obviously, Laden because the bin of Laden our activities operation and is the my most dire=tion. dramatic, In Afghanistan, but we've made very tough decisions because we felt it w=s very important, in order for an effective transition out of Afghanistan to take place, for us to be pus=ing back against the Taliban's momentum. So aside from the usual pol=tics, I don't think this is an argument that has a lot of legs. And by the=way, it's not an argument that the American people buy. They may have complaints about high unemployment still, and th=t the recovery needs to move faster, but you don't hear a lot of them argu=ng somehow that I hesitate to make decisions as commander in chief when ne=essary.

GOLDBERG: Can you just talk about Syria as a strategic issue? Talk a=out it as a humanitarian issue, as well. But it would seem to me that one =ay to weaken and further isolate Iran is to remove or help remove Iran's o=ly Arab ally.

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Absolutely.

GOLDBERG: And so the question is: What else can this administration =e doing?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Well, look, there's no doubt that Iran is much weak=r now than it was a year ago, two years ago, three years ago. The Arab Spr=ng, as bumpy as it has been, represents a strategic defeat for Iran, becau=e what people in the region have seen is that all the impulses towards freedom and self-determination and f=ee speech and freedom of assembly have been constantly violated by Iran. [=he Iranian leadership is] no friend of that movement toward human rights a=d political freedom. But more directly, it is now engulfing Syria, and Syria is basically their only true ally in =he region. And it is our estimation that [President Bashar al-Assad's] day= are numbered. It's a matter not of if, but when. Now, can we accelerate t=at? We're working with the world community to try to do that. It is complicated by the fact that Syria is a=much bigger, more sophisticated, and more complicated country than Libya, =or example -- the opposition is hugely splintered -- that although there's=unanimity within the Arab world at this point, internationally, countries like Russia are still blocking p=tential UN mandates or action. And so what we're trying to do -- and the s=cretary of state just came back from helping to lead the Friends of Syria =roup in Tunisia -- is to try to come up with a series of strategies that can provide humanitarian relief. =ut they can also accelerate a transition to a peaceful and stable and repr=sentative Syrian government. If that happens, that will be a profound loss=for Iran.

GOLDBERG: Is there anything you could do to move it faster?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Well, nothing that I can tell you, because your cla=sified clearance isn't good enough. (Laughter.)

This is part of, by the way, the context in which we have to examine our ap=roach toward Iran, because at a time when there is not a lot of sympathy f=r Iran and its only real ally is on the ropes, do we want a distraction in=which suddenly Iran can portray itself as a victim, and deflect attention from what has to be the core iss=e, which is their potential pursuit of nuclear weapons? That's an ex=mple of factors that -- when we are in consultation with all our allies, i=cluding the Israelis, we raise these factors, because this is an issue of many dimensions here, and we've got t= factor all of them in to achieve the outcome that hopefully we all want.<=r> GOLDBERG: Do the Israelis understand that? There have been disagreem=nts between Israel and the U.S. before, but this is coming to a head about=what the Israelis see as an existential issue. The question is: In your mi=d, have you brought arguments to Netanyahu that have so far worked out well?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: I think that in the end, Israel's leaders will make=determinations based on what they believe is best for the security of Isra=l, and that is entirely appropriate.

When we present our views and our strategy approach, we try to put all our =ards on the table, to describe how we are thinking about these issues. We =ry to back those up with facts and evidence. We compare their assessments =ith ours, and where there are gaps, we try to narrow those gaps. And what I also try to do is to underscore th= seriousness with which the United States takes this issue. And I think th=t Ehud Barak understands it. I think that Prime Minister Netanyahu, hopefu=ly when he sees me next week, will understand it.

And one of the things that I like to remind them of is that every single co=mitment I have made to the state of Israel and its security, I have kept. = mean, part of your -- not to put words in your mouth -- but part of the u=derlying question is: Why is it that despite me never failing to support Israel on every single problem th=t they've had over the last three years, that there are still questions ab=ut that?

GOLDBERG: That's a good way to phrase it.

PRESIDENT OBAMA: And my answer is: there is no good reason to doubt =e on these issues.

Some of it has to do with the fact that in this country and in our media, t=is gets wrapped up with politics. And I don't think that's any secret. And=if you have a set of political actors who want to see if they can drive a =edge not between the United States and Israel, but between Barack Obama and a Jewish American vote that has h=storically been very supportive of his candidacy, then it's good to try to=fan doubts and raise questions. But when you look at the record, the=e's no "there" there. And my job is to try to make sure that those political factors are washed away on an iss=e that is of such great strategic and security importance to our two count=ies. And so when I'm talking to the prime minister, or my team is talking =o the Israeli government, what I want is a hardheaded, clear-eyed assessment of how do we achieve our goa=s. And our goals are in sync. And historically, one of the reasons t=at the U.S.-Israeli relationship has survived so well and thrived is share= values, shared history, the links between our peoples. But it's also been because it has been a profoundly bipartisa= commitment to the state of Israel. And the flip side of it is that, in to=ms of Israeli politics, there's been a view that regardless of whether it'= a Democratic or Republican administration, the working assumption is: we've got Israel's back. And that's something t=at I constantly try to reinforce and remind people of.

GOLDBERG: Wait, in four words, is that your message to the prime min=ster -- we've got Israel's back?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: That is not just my message to the prime minister, =hat's been my message to the Israeli people, and to the pro-Israel communi=y in this country, since I came into office. It's hard for me to be cleare= than I was in front of the UN General Assembly, when I made a more full-throated defense of Israel and i=s legitimate security concerns than any president in history -- not, by th= way, in front of an audience that was particularly warm to the message. S= that actually won't be my message. My message will be much more specific, about how do we solve this problem.=/span>

Articl= 2.

The Washington Post=/span>

Mideast peace= with something short of a deal

Robert Malley and A=ron David Miller

March 3 -- Pre=ident Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will devote =ittle time Monday <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-=eeting-obama-to-warn-netanyahu-against-military-strikes-on-iran/2012/03/02=glQA5Wf0mR_story.html> to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in part because of Iran and election-=ear politics. But the principal cause is this: A negotiated, two-state sol=tion is running harder than ever against intractable political and psychol=gical realities in Israel, Palestine and the Arab world. These are pushing toward a de facto outcome that will =ot be negotiated, comprehensive or conflict-ending. Even assuming Netanyah= is prepared to embrace a two-state solution acceptable to Palestinians, h= would have to take on powerful settler and right-wing constituencies at a time when regional tumult and I=an's nuclear progress exacerbate national feelings of insecurity. Netany=hu's assertion that the Palestinian split and instability in the Arab wo=Id counsel against risky moves might be a convenient excuse to do nothing — but that doesn't necessarily ma=e it wrong. And he is unlikely to jeopardize his political future or his c=untry's security chasing a solution that, to his mind, does both.=/p>

Among Palestinians,=the brewing crisis over President Mahmoud Abbas's potential succession, =opular disenchantment with the peace process and the appeal of internation=lizing the conflict mean there are few political incentives for flexibility toward Israel. Divisions between the =atah and Hamas factions complicate matters: Their recent agreement is paper-thin and highlights that, for now, Palestinians are focused more on immed=ate politics than on their longer-term fate. Then there are regional developments: Abbas can no longer rely on in=luential Arab cover for controversial compromises. The Islamist wave is a =eliable indicator of where popular Arab sentiment resides; it probably wil= not translate into imminent hostility toward Israel but, at a minimum, excludes a forthcoming approach. Co=ditions will not remain static. Over time, the political landscape is like=y to be carved by local actors' concerns. Reports of Israel's isolatio= may be exaggerated, but international ill will is mounting. Israelis recognize that if Palestinians remain under occ=pation for much longer, they may drop their call for independent statehood=and demand equal rights in a single, binational (i.e., no longer Jewish) s=ate. Israel has a potential answer: a withdrawal from the most populated areas of the West Bank, preserving th= bulk of settlements and overall Israeli dominion and sparing the country = wrenching internal conflict. The idea is not new: Mooted in Gaza in 2005,=its planned extension to the West Bank was halted when Palestinians' acquisition of weapons through a poro=s border with Egypt soured Israelis' mood. Sooner or later, the plan cou=d be revived, coupled with an Israeli military presence in the Jordan Vall=y to minimize risks of a Gazan repeat. Fatah and the Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority have a long-term object=ve that differs markedly from Israel's: a state enjoying full sovereign =ights on virtually all the land occupied in 1967. But many among them are =orking toward goals that are closer at hand: building institutions of a putative state, governing their people=and lessening Israel's footprint. They are unlikely to agree with Jerusa=em over the scope of its withdrawal, which almost certainly makes negotiat=ons futile. For now, a unilateral Israeli decision could suit both sides. A greater chasm separates Ha=as's and Israel's ideas for a permanent solution. Paradoxically, this =eans they could be inclined to settle for a long-term de facto understandi=g — what the Islamist movement calls a truce and Israel calls an interim arrangement. Here, too, their perspectives col=ide, as Hamas's conception of a truce entails a full withdrawal from the=West Bank and the right of return for Palestinian refugees, steps Israel w=ll adamantly reject in a permanent or temporary agreement. Still, an

Israeli pullout from parts of the West B=nk, coupled with a mutual cease-fire but without any interaction with or r=cognition of the Jewish state, is something Hamas would welcome as a victo=y without endorsing as a deal.

Such an outcome wou=d promote the protagonists' short-term interests. Israel would mollify W=stern critics and neutralize the Palestinian demographic threat; Fatah cou=d continue building institutions of a future state; Hamas again may claim credit for pushing Israel back without=compromising on core principles. But the conflict would endure. Israel wou=d not achieve Arab recognition or an end to Palestinian claims; Fatah woul= not have produced a sovereign, independent state or resolved the refugee issue; and Hamas would have to a=quiesce in the continued presence of a Jewish state on what it considers P=lestinian land. The ultimate reckoning would still loom, arguably under co=ditions more inimical to the comprehensive resolution all claim to seek.

Since the inception=of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the status of the land between the Jo=dan River and Mediterranean Sea has been determined almost invariably by a=ts of war or unilateral decisions. Even the Oslo Accords altered the status of Palestinian territory little o= the ground. Someday this may change. For now, events outside the Israeli-Palestinian negotiat=ng relations room again for some deserve time far to more come. consideration than what's happening insid= — and could shape

</=m>

Robert Malley i= director of the International Crisis Group's Middle East and North Afri=a Program. Aaron David Miller, a distinguished scholar at the Woodrow Wils=n International Center for Scholars, is the author of the forthcoming book "Can America Have Another Great Pr=sident?"

Articl= 3.

The daily Beast

Shimon Peres=92s Influence Wanes as Israel Grows More Bellicose Toward Iran

Dan Ephron</=>>

March 2, 2012 -- The oddest odd couple in Israeli politics might just be Prime Minist=r Benjamin Netanyahu and President Shimon Peres, both of whom are in Washi=gton this week for meetings with President Obama <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/02/26/obama-won-t-bac=-an-israeli-strike-on-iran.html> . Netanyahu is an unwavering skeptic with a deep devotio= to Greater Israel, Peres a relentlessly optimistic peacenik. Yet for much=of the past three years, Netanyahu had no bigger booster than Peres, who r=peatedly vouched for him with foreign leaders and assured people he genuinely wants peace. Netanyahu, in return,=allowed Peres a brief role in contacts with the Palestinians, though as pr=sident, his job description restricts him mostly to pomp and circumstance.=nbsp; Now the honeymoon =ight be ending. People familiar with the relationship say tensions have bu=bled to the surface in recent <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/02/07/u-s-jews-should=heed-top-israeli-soldiers-who-oppose-bombing-iran.html> months while <http://www.thedailybeast.com/cheats/2012/02/27/israel-won-t-warn=u-s-on-iran-strike.html> Netanyahu over how is to expected cope with to Iran's tell Obama nuclear that ambitions Isr=el will take action and on what its own to offer the Pales=inians. if sanctions So much against so that Iran don't produce quick results—ra=sing the specter of a regional war—Peres has different ideas. "When yo= see that the United States and Europe are taking steps Ito prevent Iran f=om getting nuclear weapons] ... that's the way right now," he told Newsweek in a recent interview in Jerusalem. "=e don't have to monopolize it." &nb=p;

That Israel's two most senior political figures don't see eye t= eye on the weightiest issues of the day is hardly unprecedented. Israel=92s first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, is said to have imbued the presidency with zero executive powers precisely to=prevent his political rival, Chaim Weizmann, from having a role in the dec=sion making. But it's a reminder that even as Israel edges toward confro=tation with Iran, in defiance of Washington, how to deal with the mullahs is the subject of fierce debate i=side Israel—not just within the political establishment but also in the =ilitary and the intelligence community. It's also a reflection of Netanyahu's dimini=hed status among a certain group of politicians, public figures, and journ=lists who believed three years ago that Netanyahu would surprise everyone 9 striking a deal with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. Peres is merely the latest member of the group to face disi=lusionment. "For a long time, Peres nurtured the hope that with his inpu= and consultation, Netanyahu would be much more forthcoming and active in =he peace process," says David Landau, who has coauthored two books with Peres and sees him regularly. "But of =ate, Peres has given up that hope." &=bsp;

The backstory of the bromance betw=en Peres and Netanyahu is a complicated one. In 1996 the two had squared o=f in one of Israel's most fiercely fought elections for prime minister, just months after a right-wing Jew murdered =sraeli leader Yitzhak Rabin in a bid to halt the Oslo peace process. Peres=succeeded Rabin, but then lost to Netanyahu by less than half a percentage=point, leaving the Israeli left with the feeling that the assassin had won—and casting a dark cloud over=the fate of the peace process. Yossi Beilin, who served as a member of Per=s's cabinet at the time, recalls feeling bereft, "really broken," wh=n results were announced. Yet he found Peres remarkably composed. He remembers overhearing Peres ask his wife on =he phone that day what she was cooking. When the answer, chicken, came bac=, Peres gave her the standard response: I'll be home for lunch. The ability to rebound from defeat was vintage P=res, but bad-mouthing he didn't seem political to harbor enemies=97his a grudge decades-long against Netanyahu, rivalry which with Rabin, surp=ised a member people of around his own him. party, Peres produced is not above some seriously nasty invective. But pe=ple who know him say they've never heard him utter a bad word about Neta=yahu, either after the election or in the years since. Landau attributes t=e courtesy to a certain reverence for Yoni Netanyahu, Benjamin's brother, who was killed leading the darin= rescue of hostages at Entebbe in 1976. Peres, who served as defense minis=er at the time, dispatched Yoni on the mission and carries the burden of e=fectively having signed his death warrant.

One way or another, Peres seems to have welcomed Netanyahu's retu=n to the prime minister's office in 2009, even as members of the peace c=mp cringed. By then Peres had been serving as president for almost two years and was able to lend a hand by, among ot=er things, smoothing early wrinkles in Netanyahu's relationship with Oba=a. But the good will appears to have run out last September, when Netanyah= vetoed a meeting Peres was to have held with Abbas in Amman, Jordan. The two had met secretly on four previou= occasions in what amounted to the most vigorous surge of diplomacy betwee= Israelis and Palestinians in years. Netanyahu hoped the meetings would di=ert Abbas from petitioning the United Nations for membership, according to a source in Netanyahu's inne= circle, a move Israel feared would lead to its isolation. When Abbas pres=ed ahead with the U.N. initiative, Netanyahu terminated the Peres backchan=el. About the prospects of an agreement with the=Palestinians, Peres said the gaps were small, a characterization that is a= odds with even the most upbeat assessments in the region.

In the interview with Newsweek, Peres sidestepped questions about t=nsions with Netanyahu. At 88, Peres has more than a quarter century on the=lsraeli prime minister, a gap that seems to infuse even his frustrations with an avuncular spirit. But he did say r=peatedly that giving time for sanctions against Iran to work was the right=thing to do (Netanyahu has said the sanctions aren't enough and has made=clear to the Americans that Israel might launch airstrikes). He also said Obama appeared to have a "deep co=viction" that Iran must not get the bomb, in contrast to the skepticism =ome people around Netanyahu express about the American president. "Let=92s give the necessary time to see the effect of the economic sanctions," he said in his Jerusalem office. "There is=quite an important alliance to prevent it from happening [Iran developing =uclear weapons]. Give them a chance."

About the prospects of an agreement with the Palestinians, Peres sa=d the gaps were small, a characterization that is at odds with even the mo=t upbeat assessments in the region. Israelis and Palestinians have not engaged in sustained talks in more than three ye=rs, the longest diplomatic drought since the start of the Oslo peace proce=s in 1993. Most observers believe that both sides are moving away from an =greement that would resolve their conflict, not toward one. =nbsp;

But Peres is irrepressible as always. He says the setbacks are blip= on a graph line that has mostly ascended since the '70s and '80s, whe= Israel and the PLO refused to even recognize each other. And he believes there's no real alternative to the two-state=solution if Israel wants to maintain its democratic character. Peres recen=ly co-wrote a book with Landau about his mentor, Ben-Gurion. It concludes =hat Ben-Gurion's greatest decision was accepting the United Nations partition plan, which gave Israel a state=but much less territory than it sought. The book is a historical accountin= from a man who worked under him for decades. But Landau says Peres also t=inks of it as a contemporary tract. "He's trying to deliver a message to people here and now that nothing =as changed since Ben-Gurion's decision," Landau said. "In order to m=intain a democratic country, Israel needs to forgo part of the territory.=94

Articl= 4.

Bulletin of the Ato=ic Scientists

Fearful of a =uclear Iran? The real WMD nightmare is Syria

Charles P. Blair

1 March 2012 -- As =ossible military action against Iran's suspected nuclear weapons program Iroms large in the public arena, far more international concern should be di=ected toward Syria and its weapons of mass destruction. When the Syrian uprising began more than a year ago, =ew predicted the regime of President Bashar al-Assad would ever teeter tow=rd collapse. Now, though, the demise of Damascus's current leadership appe=rs inevitable, and Syria's revolution will likely be an unpredictable, protracted, and grim affair. Some see sim=larities with Libya's civil war, during which persistent fears revolved ar=und terrorist seizure of Libyan chemical weapons, or the Qaddafi regime's =se of them against insurgents. Those fears turned out to be unfounded.

But the Libyan chem=cal stockpile consisted of several tons of aging mustard gas leaking from = half-dozen canisters that would have been impossible to utilize as weapon=. Syria likely has one of the largest and most sophisticated chemical weapon programs in the world. Moreover, Sy=ia may also possess an offensive biological weapons capability that Libya =id not.

While it is uncerta=n whether the Syrian regime would consider using WMD against its domestic =pponents, Syrian insurgents, unlike many of their Libyan counterparts, are=increasingly sectarian and radicalized; indeed, many observers fear the uprising is being "hijacked" by =ihadists. Terrorist groups active in the Syrian uprising have already demo=strated little compunction about the acquisition and use of WMD. In short,=should Syria devolve into full-blown civil-war, the security of its WMD should be of profound concern, as sectarian insurg=nts and Islamist terrorist groups may stand poised to seize chemical and p=rhaps even biological weapons.

An enormous unconve=tional arsenal. Syria's chemical weapons stockpile is thought to be massive <http://www.dni.gov/reports/2011_report_to_congress_wmd.pdr> . One of only eight nations that is not a mem=er of the Chemical W=apons Convention <http://www.opcw.orenews-publications/publications/facts-rnd-figuresk -- an arms co=trol agreement that outlaws the production, possession, and use of chemical weapons -- Syria has a chemical arsenal</rpan> that includes several hundred tons of blistering agents along with likely =arge stockpiles of deadly nerve the Chemical W=apons Convention <http://www.opcw.orenews-publications/publications/facts-rnd-figuresk -- an arms co=trol agreement that outlaws the production, possession, and use of chemical weapons -- Syria has a chemical arsenal</rpan> that includes several hundred tons of blistering agents along with likely =arge stockpiles of deadly nerve agents, including VX, the most toxic of al= chemical weapons. At least four large chemical weapon production facilities <http://www.nti.org/facilities/708/> exist. Additionally, Syria likely stores <http://www.nti.rsvpl.com/gsn/article/us-calculates-big-mi=itary-footprint-may-be-needed-guard-syrian-chemical-arms/?mghrhttp%3A%2F=2Fwww.nti.org&amp;mgf=1> its deadly chemical weapons at dozens of facilities throughout agents, including VX, the most toxic of al= chemical weapons. At least four large chemical weapon production facilities

the fr=ctious country. In contrast to Libya's unusable chemical stockpile, analys=s emphasize that Syrian chemical agents are weaponized and deliverable. In=urgents and terrorists with past or present connections to the military might feasibly be able to effectively =inseminate chemical agents over large populations. (The Global Security Newswire <http://www.nti.oregsn/article/us-watching-syrian-chemica=-arms-amid-fear-attack-diversionk recently asserted that "[tJhe Assad regime is thought to possess between 100 and 200 Scud missiles carrying wa=heads loaded with sarin nerve agent. The government is also believed to ha=e several hundred tons of sarin agent and mustard gas stockpiled that coul= be used in air-dropped bombs and artillery shells, according to information compiled by the James Martin Ce=ter.")

Given its robust ch=mical weapons arsenal and its perceived need to deter Israel, Syria has lo=g been suspected of having an active biological weapons program. Despite s=gning the Biological Weapons and Toxins Convention in 1972 (the treaty prohibits the development, production, and =tockpiling of biological and toxin weapons), Syria never ratified the=treaty. Some experts contend that any Syrian biological weapons program ha= not moved beyond the research and development phase. Still, Syria's biotechnical infrastructure undoubtedly has the capability <http://www.dni.gov/reports/2011_report_to_congress_wmd.pdf> to develop numerous biological weapon agents. After Israel destroyed a clandestine Sy=ian nuclear reactor in September 2007, Damascus may have accelerated its c=emical and biological weapons programs.

It's hard to guard =MD when a government collapses. Although the United States and its allies =re reportedly monitoring Syria's chemical weapons, recent history warns th=t securing them from theft or transfer is an extraordinary challenge. For example, during Operation Iraqi Freedom= more than 330 metric tons of military-grade high explosives vanished from=Iraq's Al-Qaqaa military installation. Almost 200 tons of the most powerfu= of Iraq's high-explosives, HMX -- used Al-Qaqaa's some by some states to detonate nuclear weapons -- was under Internatio=al Atomic Energy Agency seal. Many tons of sealed HMX reported'= went missing in the early days of the war in Iraq. Forensic tests later r=vealed that of these military-grade explosives <http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/fate-of-high-e=plosives-at-al-qaqaa-still-unknown-increasing-indications-th/tinotes> were subsequently employed against US and coalition forces. Al-Qaqaa's

Even with a nationw=de presence of 200,000 coalition troops, several other sensitive military =ites were also looted, looted, Even with a nationw=de presence of 200,000 coalition troops, several other sensitive military =ites were also including Iraq's main nuclear complex, Tuwaitha. Sh=uld centralized authority crumble in Syria, it seems highly unlikely that the country's 50 chemical storage and=manufacturing facilities -- and, possibly, biological weapon repositories =- <http://www.nti.rsvpl.com/gsn/article/us-calculates-big- can that mi=itary-footprint-may-be-needed-guard-syrian-chemical-arms/?mgh.http%3A%2F=2Fwww.nti.org&amp;mgf=1> be it would secured. take The more US Defense than 75,000 Department US military recently personnel estimated to guard Syria's=chemical weapons. This is, of course, if they could arrive before any WMD =ere transferred or looted -- a highly unlikely prospect.

Complicating any ef=orts to secure Syria's WMD, post-Assad, are its porous borders <http://tarpley.net/docs/CTCForeignFighter.19.Dec07.pdf> =span style="font-size:18.0pt">. With Syria's government distracted by in=ernal revolt and US forces now fully out of Iraq, it is plausible that stolen chemical or biological weapons could =ind their way across the Syrian border into Iraq. Similarly, Syrian WMD co=ld be smuggled into southern Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, the West Bank, =srael, and, potentially, the United States and Europe.

At least six formal=terrorist organizations have long maintained personnel within Syria. Three=of these groups <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/170479.pdf> Hamas, Hizbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jiha= -- have already attempted to acquire or use chemical or biological agents, or both. Perhaps more troubling, Al Qae=a-affiliated In <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2012/0221/As-A=-Qaeda-moves-fight-to-Syria-violence-in-lraq-drops-sharply> fighters large the clouds past, from Al of Iraq Qaeda-in=lraq chlorine have streamed gas. The fighters entry into attempted Syria of Al Qaeda to and use , acting, ot=er chemical jihadist in -- part, weapons, groups on orders most from notably Al Qaeda attacks leader that=sought Ayman al-Zawahiri. to release

<http://thewasat.wordpress.com/2012/01/30/jabhah-al-nusrah=and-jihad-in-syriah into the Sy=ian crisis underscores its increasingly sectarian manifestation. Nearly 40 percent of Syria's population consists =f members of minority communities. Syria's ruling Alawite regime, a b=anch of Shia Islam, is considered heretical by many of Syria's majori=y

Sunni Muslims -- even those who are not jihadists. Alawites, Druze, Kurds, and Christians could all become targets=for WMD-armed Sunni jihadists. Similarly, Shiite radicals could conceivabl= employ WMD agents against Syria's Sunnis.

Religious fanaticis= and WMD. Evidence of growing religious fanaticism is also reflected in re=ent Syrian suicide attacks. Since last December, at least five suicide att=cks occurred in Syria. In the 40 years preceding, only two suicide attacks were recorded. Al Qaeda-linked mujahid=n are believed to be responsible for all of these recent attacks. Civil wa=s are often the most violent and unpredictable manifestations of war. With=expanding sectarian divisions, the use of seized WMD in Syria's uprising is plausible. To the extent that=religious extremists believe that they are doing God's bidding, fundamenta=ly any action they undertake is justified, no matter how abhorrent, since =he "divine" ends are believed to legitimize

<http://www.cs.washington.edu/education/courses/csep590/05=u/readings/Bale_Ackerman_FinalReport.pdf> t=e means.

The situation in Sy=ia is unprecedented. Never before has a WMD-armed country fallen into civi= war. All states in the region stand poised to lose if these weapons find =heir way outside of Syria. The best possible outcome, in terms of controlling Syria's enormous WMD arsenal, wo=ld be for Assad to maintain power, but such an outcome seems increasingly =mplausible. And there is painfully little evidence that democratic forces =re likely to take over in Syria. Even if they do eventually triumph, it will take months or years to consol=date control over the entire country.

If chaos ensues in =yria, the United States cannot go it alone in securing hundreds of tons of=Syrian WMD. Regional leaders -- including some, such as Sunni Saudi Arabia=and Shiite Iran, that are now backing the insurgency and the regime, respectively -- must come together and begi= planning to avert a dispersion of Syrian chemical or biological weapons t=at would threaten everyone, of any political or religious persuasion, in t=e Middle East and around the world.

Articl= 5.

The Daily Star

Hamas rattles=the Resistance Axis

Rami G. Khouri

March 03, 2012 -- The decision last week by the Palestinian Islamist movement Hamas to abando= its external headquarters in Damascus and support Syrians demonstrating f=r the removal of Bashar Assad's regime is noteworthy on several levels. =11 of them affirm the vulnerable and changing nature of strategic conditions across the Middle East.=/p>

The decision by Ham=s to abandon Syria emphasizes at the most basic level the pragmatic and po=itical nature of the movement, as opposed to its rigid ideological or theo=ogical foundations. When the kitchen gets too hot, rational people get out, and so do Arab Islamist resistance =ovements, it seems.

This is in line wit= Hamas' gradual slide into a more pragmatic political posture over the p=st decade. During this time the movement has declared its willingness to a=cept a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza and coexistence with Israel, if the principles of the 2002 A=ab Peace Plan are adopted and the Palestine refugee issue is resolved equi=ably. Hamas has also signaled a willingness to abandon the armed struggle =n favor of nonviolent resistance against Israel, and to agree to a long-term truce with Israel under certai= conditions.

At another level, H=mas' decision to leave Syria reflects ongoing internal divisions within =he movement. Islamist organizations, in the final analysis, experience the=same dynamics as any grouping of diverse people united by a common cause, but also divided over the many options th=y have to achieve their goals.

We can see this in =he different tactical strands among Hamas officials vis-a-vis the reconc=liation with Fatah. The implications of these various views over issues su=h as negotiations with or recognition of Israel, power-sharing with Fatah, relations with Iran, or support for A=ab uprisings across the region — which range from hard-line absolutism t= a more accommodating pragmatism — are that groups like Hamas operate ac=ording to a domestic political calculus of survival that ultimately overrides other forces.

This is also seen i= the quiet debate within llamas about whether to consolidate its power base=in Gaza and make do with a diminutive Palestinian statelet that makes litt=e sense to anyone other than Hamas operatives; or to rejoin and reconfigure Palestinian national institutions=such as the Palestine Liberation Organization, to continue the struggle na=ionally and regionally.

This raises the thi=d level of analysis of Hamas' decision, which relates to the condition o= that grouping of states and movements called the Resistance and Deterrenc= Front — namely Syria, Hezbollah, Iran and Hamas. These four partners have always been fascinating for several re=sons, including their ability to transcend traditional divides in the Midd=e East, such as Sunni-Shiite, Arab-Iranian, and religious-secular divides.=/span>

Hamas' decision t= turn against Damascus is a blow to the Front, but probably a minor one fo= now, in a volatile region. The Syrian government is under intense pressur= at home and abroad, and may not survive in its present form. The Iranian government faces its own vulnerabilities =t home and globally, and continues to be the major regional loser from the=Arab uprisings.

Hezbollah in Lebano= — probably the strongest member of the front in the short term — must=be working overtime to calculate how it should respond to possible scenari=s on the horizon (the fall of the Assad regime, an attack on Iran, a revival of the Green Movement in Iran, an Ira=ian-Western nuclear agreement, and so on).

Hamas and Syria are=the most vulnerable members of the Resistance and Deterrence Front these d=ys. How Hamas plays its cards in the months ahead probably will not have a=major impact on the region as a whole, because the movement has become a relatively minor and constrained actor i= its Gaze fiefdom. Syria's impact on the region would be much greater, s=ould the regime change, or only alter its policies. For now, we can only c=nclude two things: The Resistance and Deterrence Front, like any political construct, is vulnerable to chang=; and, Islamist movements such as Hamas will make political decisions base= on pragmatism and realism as much as on ideological purity and absolutism=

The changes under w=y in the region are a logical step in the ongoing reconfiguration of power=relationships in the Middle East, following the first year of the Arab upr=sings. Hamas' reversal on Syria is an important example of how Islamist groups continue to make the transitio= from their previous world of abstract political opposition and often bloo=y and costly resistance, to the new environment in which they must grapple=more convincingly with real-world conditions and options, especially the spreading advent of populist legiti=acy and accountability in Arab countries.

Two of the four mem=ers of the Resistance and Deterrence Front have been hit by the Arab upris=ngs. Others will follow in due course.

Articl= 6.

Pew Research Center=/span>

Millennials w=11 benefit and suffer due to their hyperconnected lives

(Overview)<=>

February 29, 2012&n=sp; -- In a survey about the future of the internet, technology experts an= stakeholders were fairly evenly split as to whether the younger generatio='s always-on connection to people and information will turn out to be a net positive or a net negative by 2020. They said ma=y of the young people growing up hyperconnected to each other and the mobi=e Web and counting on the internet as their external brain will be nimble,=quick-acting multitaskers who will do well in key respects.

At the same time, t=ese experts predicted that the impact of networked living on today's you=g will drive them to thirst for instant gratification, settle for quick ch=ices, and lack patience. A number of the survey respondents argued that it is vital to reform education and emp=asize digital literacy. A notable number expressed concerns that trends ar= leading to a future in which most people are shallow consumers of informa=ion, and some mentioned George Orwell's 1984 or expressed their fears of control by powerful interests =n an age of entertaining distractions.

These findings come=from an opt-in, online survey of a diverse but non-random sample of 1,021 =echnology stakeholders and critics. The study was fielded by the Pew Resea=ch Center's Internet & American Life Project and Elon University's Imagining the Internet Center between Augu=t 28 and October 31, 2011.

The survey question=about younger users was inspired by speculation over the past several year= about the potential impact of technology on them. Looking toward the year=2020, respondents to this survey were fairly evenly split on whether the results will be primarily positive or m=stly negative. They were asked to read two statements and select the one t=ey believe that is most likely to be true and then explain their answers.

Some 55% agreed wit= the statement:

In 2020 the brains =f multitasking teens and young adults are "wired" differently fr=m those over age 35 and overall it yields helpful results. They do not suf=er notable cognitive shortcomings as they multitask and cycle quickly through personal- and work-related tasks. Rather, they a=e learning more and they are more adept at finding answers to deep questio=s, in part because they can search effectively and access collective intel=igence via the internet. In sum, the changes in learning behavior and cognition among the young generally p=oduce positive outcomes.

Some 42% agreed wit= the opposite statement, which posited:

In 2020, the brains=of multitasking teens and young adults are "wired" differently f=om those over age 35 and overall it yields baleful results. They do not re=ain information; they spend most of their energy sharing short social messages, deep-thinking being entertained, c=pabilities; and they being lack distracted face-to-face awa= social from skills; deep they engagement depend in with unhealthy=ways people and knowledge. on the internet They and lack mobile devices to function. In sum, the changes in behavior and cognition among t=e young are generally negative outcomes.

While 55% agreed wi=h the statement that the future for the hyperconnected will generally be p=sitive, many who chose that view noted that it is more their hope than the=r best guess, and a number of people said the true outcome will be a combination of both scenarios. The researc= result here is really probably more like a 50-50 outcome than the 55-42 s=lit recorded through survey takers' votes. Respondents were asked to sel=ct the positive or the negative, with no middle-ground choice, in order to encourage a spirited and deeply =onsidered written elaboration about the potential future of hyperconnected=people.

We did not offer a =hird alternative — that young people's brains would not be wired diffe=ently — but some of the respondents made that argument in their elaborat=ons. They often noted that people's patterns of thinking will likely change, though the actual mechanisms of brain func=ion will not change.

Survey participants=did offer strong, consistent predictions about the most desired life skill= for young people in 2020. crowd-sourcing Among those solutions); they listed the ability are: public to search problem-sol=ing effectivel= for through information cooperative online work and to (sometimes be able to referred discern the to as quality and veracity=of the information one finds and then communicate these findings well (ref=rred to as digital literacy); synthesizing (being able to bring together details from many sources); being strategica=ly future-minded; the ability to concentrate; and the ability to distingui=h between the "noise" and the message in the ever-growing sea of infor=ation.

Here is a sampling =f their predictions and arguments:

• The env=ronment itself will be full of data that can be retrieved almost effortles=ly, and it will be arrayed in ways to help people — young and old — na=igate their lives. Quick-twitch younger technology users will do well mastering these datastreams.

• Millennials' brains=are being rewired to adapt to the new information-processing skills they w=ll need to survive in this environment.

• "Memories are becoming hyperlinks to information triggered by keywor=s and URLs. We are becoming 'persistent paleontologists' of our own ex=ernal memories, as our brains are storing the keywords to get back to those memories and not the full memories themselves," arg=ed Amber Case, CEO of Geoloqi.

• There is evidence now that "supertaskers" can handle several compl=cated tasks well, noted communications expert Stowe Boyd. And some survey respondents noted that it is not necessa=ily only young adults who do this well.

• Young people accustomed to a diet of quick-fix information nuggets wil= be less likely to undertake deep, critical analysis of issues and challen=ing information. Shallow choices, an expectation of instant gratification, a lack of patience, are likely to be common resu=ts, especially for those who do not have the motivation or training that w=ll help them master this new environment. One possible outcome is stagnati=n in innovation.

• Another possibility, though, is that evolving social structures will c=eate a new "division of labor" that rewards those who make swift, corr=ct decisions as they exploit new information streams and rewards the specialists who retain left-behind the skills will of be focused, mired deep in the t=inking. shallow New diversions winners offered and losers by techn=logy. will emerge in this reconfigured environmen=; the

• There are concerns about new social divides. "I suspect we're goin= to see an increased class division around labor and skills and attention,=94 said media scholar danah boyd.

- attention-allocation • A key bal=nce differentiator in this new between environment. winners Just and as losers we lost wil= oral be tradition winners' with capacity the writt=n to figure word, out the we correct will lose something big in the coming world, but we will gain as =ell. "As Sophocles once said, 'Nothing vast enters the life of mortals=without a curse," noted Tiffany Shlain, director of the film Connected and founder of=the Webby Awards.

• "The essential skills will be those of rapidly searching, browsing, =ssessing quality, and synthesizing the vast quantities of information," =rote Jonathan Grudin, principal researcher at Microsoft. "In contrast, =he ability to read one thing and think hard about it for hours will not be=of no consequence, but it will be of far less consequence for most people.=94

• Some argued that technology is not the issue as much as bedrock human =ehavior is. The "moral panic" over digital technology "seems to be w=red into us,"—it parallels previous concerns about media that have not led to the downfall of civilization, noted Christopher J.=Ferguson, a professor from Texas A&M whose research specialty is t=chnologies' effects on human behavior.

• Reform of the education system is necessary to help learners know how =o maximize the best and minimize the worst. Reform could start by recogniz=ng that distractions of all kinds are the norm now. Educators should teach the management of multiple information streams, emp=asizing the skills of filtering, analyzing, and synthesizing information. =Iso of value is an appreciation for silence, focused contemplation, and =93lessons in ignoring people," as futurist Marcel Bullinga put it.

* Others noted research that challenges t=e idea that people can be "multitaskers." People really toggle between=tasks and "time slice" their attention into ever-smaller chunks of tim=, argued Nikki Reynolds, director of instructional technology services at Ham=lton College.

Futurist John Smart= president and founder of the Acceleration Studies Foundation, recalled an=insight of economist Simon Kuznets about evolution of technology effects k=own as the Kuznets curve: "First-generation tech usually causes 'net negative' social effects; second-generation =91net neutral' effects; by the third generation of tech—once the tech =s smart enough, and we've got the interface right, and it begins to reinfo=ce the best behaviors—we finally get to 'net positive' effects," he noted. "We'll be early into conversational in=erface and agent technologies by 2020, so kids will begin to be seriously =ntelligently augmented by the internet. There will be many persistent draw=acks however [so the effect at this point will be net neutral]. The biggest problem from a personal-development pers=ective will be motivating people to work to be more self-actualized, produ=tive, and civic than their parents were. They'll be more willing than ever=to relax and remain distracted by entertainments amid accelerating technical productivity.

"As machine intel=igence advances," Smart explained, "the first response of humans is to=offload their intelligence and motivation to the machines. That's a dehuma=izing, first-generation response. Only the later, third-generation educational systems will correct for this."

Another comprehensi=e insight came from Barry Chudakov, a Florida-based consultant and a resea=ch fellow in the McLuhan Program in Culture and Technology at the Universi=y of Toronto. He wrote that by 2020, "Technology will be so seamlessly integrated into our lives that it will=effectively disappear. The line between self and technology is thin today=by then it will effectively vanish. We will think with, think into, and th=nk through our smart tools but their presence and reach into our lives will be less visible. Youth will assume =heir minds and intentions are extended by technology, while tracking techn=logies will seek further incursions into behavioral monitoring and choice =anipulation. Children will assume this is the way the world works. The cognitive challenge children and yout= will face (as we are beginning to face now) is integrity, the state of be=ng whole and undivided. There will be a premium on the skill of maintainin= presence, of mindfulness, of awareness in the face of persistent and pervasive tool extensions and incursions int= our lives. Is this my intention, or is the tool inciting me to feel and t=ink this way? That question, more than multitasking or brain atrophy due t= accessing collective intelligence via the internet, will be the challenge of the future."